

AFRICA AND RECOLONIZATION: DIALECTICS OF MAZRUIAN THEORETICAL STATEMENT

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Abstract

Right from time, theoretical framework constitutes the central curvature of learning fore grounded in structured survey which projects a typical study of history and the present and providing predictive synergy. The paper is anchored on qualitative research, which explores mainly the secondary sources of data with specific reference to relevant journal articles, text books, internet and other archives. Thus, content analysis was utilized to analyze the issues raised in the paper. As unraveled, Africa has been consummated in tripartite imperialism counting from the West multiple incursion to the bipolar Cold War configuration. The third is woven around BRICS emergence in quest of global hegemony resting mainly on Africa, which paradoxically defines Mazruian broad scope of recolonization theory by appraising the ulterior motive of BRICS collage equation and the associated flaws of multi-polarity. Six selected African states constitute the derivate that formally define the total derivation of Africa permanent stasis of elastic imperialism, though spatial, buoyantly justifying the template of recolonization in the Post-New World regime.

Keywords: Africa, BRICS, Dialectics, Mazruian, Recolonization,

Introduction

Most situations ranging from individuals to institutions are subject to theoretical evaluation and interpretation. This helps examine the relationship between the present and history as means of projecting the future. Precisely, the social sciences is mainly concerned about the framework of the model of study which must span beyond the casual to ideological level of meaning. It is believed that any piece of analysis is an explanatory body of equation that is signified by theoretical balancing. The varied networking of actions and manifestation of actors invariably become relevant on this justification. Any manifestation falls within the purview of theoretical configuration either in terms of the particular or generalization, which must be followed with definite understanding and observation of prevailing events. The indices of logic and method help guide proposition and synthesis of theoretical formulation.

With reference to relative measurement, Cole and Zuckerman (1975:140) argue that a theoretical perspective is equivalent to a paradigm. This is subject to further analysis since it is limited to coded procedure of emphasis compared to the broad scope of theoretical construction and

clarification. More so, it is built around strong predictive synergy that constitutes scientific explanation of the anticipated. Furthermore, it determines the conduct of inquiry yielding summation of discovered facts and learning.

This paper runs a typical examination of theory in the social sciences on Magrui predictive synergy of Africa politics in the context of recolonization theory. The scope of this theory as related to BRICS project is appraised with basic consideration of Africa post- independence issues woven around endless decolonization process. Furthermore, the paradox of South Africa integration coupled with the associated multi-polarity regime tactically meant to reduce the essence of imperial calculation becomes the significance of the analysis.

Methodologically, the paper is anchored on qualitative research, which explores mainly the secondary sources of data with specific reference to relevant journal articles, text books, internet and other archives. Thus, content analysis was utilized to analyze the issues raised in the paper

Dialectics of Recolonization Theory

The global meltdown of 2008 aptly pairs the hegemonic downslide of the West and the offshoot of the BRICS yielding the broadened scope of the latter. Mazrui (1994:62) argues that Africa political economy remains worse off and has become more marginalized than ever considering the limited facilities meant for addressing its countless problems. Africa, therefore, lays defining the process of unfinished decolonization. All this challenges become the prime mover of the bulk of this theory done by Ali Mazrui and the entire scope is built around the emergence of external hegemonic intervention. To be precise, Mazrui (1994) appraises recolonization on the endless devastating issues within and without.

The theory is articulated 1994 in memorialization of two political paradoxes in Africa – the close of apartheid regime in South Africa and the cataclysmic genocide in Rwanda. In view of limited external concern, the concept of pax -Africana was suggested to capture the essence of self-colonization with due regard to effecting appropriate means of structuring strong institutional command and development. To complement above claim, Mazrui (1995, p. 20) states that:

I am advocating self- colonization by Africa. I am against the return of European colonialism and the equivalent of fax Britannics. But I fear that if Africans do not take control of their destiny themselves, including the use of benevolent force for self- pacification, they will once again be victims of malevolent force by others.

Above excerpt presents two variants of recolonization, but Mazrui explicitly proposes to the internal against the external. This theorist, therefore urges outstanding African states with distinct resources to recolonize, or better still, pursue self- colonization as means of defining self in global political arrangement. Bull (quoted in Adem 2010:5) avers that Mazrui displays abounding and expository ideology of the developing world in the consistent drift of hegemony politics, and more so, devices several ideational and institutional means to strategic themes patterned after pax–Africanism and nationalism within the organic structure of propping Africa in the blossoming global politics.

The theoretical phrase “ inter-Africa” is employed by Mazrui (1994) as related to recolonization vis-à-vis the merging of Zanzibar and Tangayika yielding Tanzania (Akpotor 2011:38-39). To consolidate the above, Ngugi (2009:48) asserts that this will help “re-member Africa after

dismemberment” in the Berlin conference 1884-85. In a comparative theoretical postulation, Mazrui (1994) draws his life to “one long debate” a typical political unit that captures the wholesome African polity that continues to pendulate between unending colonialism and decolonization. It must be noted that to mark the final phase of Africa decolonization in the fiftieth year of OAU now AU, African leaders converged to celebrate the final independence expressing renaissance characteristic of the period. However, the BRICS launched a proxy hegemonic intervention in Africa. It is not a sheer coincidence, but relevantly contrasts the buoyant ceremony. Relatively, this hegemonic interplay connotes formal inauguration of fresh phase of imperialism and extensively portrays that the end of colonization is the beginning of recolonization. This foregrounds Gordon (2008, p. 207) assertion that “ Africa is not in other words, simply invented but Africa continues to be invented and reinvented, both inside and outside the term of Africa peoples; The ceaseless external impartation in Africa relations confirms this truism and precisely, the emergent BRICS.

Afro-BRICS interplay is foregrounded by the frame work of recolonization theory. In the first place, Africa was colonized by the West until its emancipation in the 1960s. Second, BRICS is an emergent global hegemony with the motif of multi-polarity that integrates Marxism and capitalism as means of exploiting the economy of Africa and balancing itself with the developed economics. The adoption of Marxism only addresses the flaws without considering how Marxist egalitarian economies have been misapplied for capitalist manipulation, hence its stagnant and non-developmental characteristics. This is noted in the BRICS conversion of multi-polarity concept meant to pursue horizontal global system to Angola-model built around capitalist intervention showing the ulterior concern of Marxism.

Recolonization has a broad perspective. For a better analysis, Mazrui (1994) breaks the theory into three phases. Benevolent model expense of the colonizer. The code could either be internal or external on the basis of the intended goal. Benign is structurally symbiotic and both parties derive balanced benefit. This pattern is mostly constituted on regional integration to check any form of negative external influence. The Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS), Responsibility to Protect (RtP) of African Union (AU) coupled with the strategic formulation of New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) by Nigeria and South Africa are distinct case-studies. Though paradoxical, BRICS multi-polarity falls into this category but for the dysfunction and institutional bias. Malignant model is the last. It is highly flawed as it bears the portraiture of the colonization with characteristic feature of exploitation of both human and material resources of the colonized. Beyond the normative, malignant model fits well the relationship between these two groups in the exchange of international goods.

It must be noted that the period characterizing the end of the Cold War is named New World Order, but for the global meltdown that overhauled the global economy except China, the eloquent survivor, that further translates the international world to another phase, Post-New World order. Invariably, this marks the changing trend of hegemonic metamorphosis of the Asian team and other peripheries in the mainstream of global political economy. The political economy of the two actors typically captures a replay of the West imperial syndrome, and more so, the transnationalization of BRICS makes the transcript of recolonization and Africa a permanent post-colony.

Basically Mazrui (1994) articulates this theoretical epoch around totalization scheme of internal re-colonization, hence the “inter Africa” factor which has related postulation. Mazrui places

emphasis on the enterprising synergy of Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt. Addressing the synthesis of recolonization Ndlovu-Gatshani (2014:2) sees recolonization as the debates in Mazrui expansive work of the invention of Africa meaning of Africinity, and the concomitant complex question of the Africa condition. Invariably, some critics hold the view that BRICS intervention is internal, South Africa being a member. However, against the grain, the Africa party was engaged 2010 to certify the global hegemonic outfit of the BRICS and further shield their exploitative modalities in Africa. Related data shows that South Africa remains a particular victim of exploitation within the bloc. When recolonization theory is distilled from its original viewpoint, the external variant becomes the defining index with structural interrogation of marginal ranking South Africa occupies and the varied continental locations of the other four. This theory has strong intellectual footing as it possesses the two fundamental stages: one, the latent examines the predictive synergy which tacitly defines the long lasting prognosins of the theoretical statement. Two, the manifest displays practical evidences both at short and long term projection in a definite analysis. These two facilities create the avalanche for further studies as means of investigating the theoretical standpoint and relative meaning.

Africa and the Emergent BRICS: Mazruian Latent Imperative

From all indications, Africa has been the defining index of hegemonic tension lasting from Atlantic slave trade to the prevalent BRICS incursion. All this varied dimensions have continued to modify Africa political economy framework, thus Ibrahim etal (2011, p. 1) argue that the number of challenges limiting development include foreign aid, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) environment and climate problems, issues of Millennial Development Goals (MDGs) with diverse diplomatic details. However Mazrui (1994:60) driving the analysis from history avers that the cellapse of communism has engendered Africa marginalization further and this is due to the west imperial import characterized by extreme capitalism without alternative. Based on the outstanding, external forces continue to dominate Africa which shows that its integration into global diplomacy has been marred by flawed determinism and extensively displays lopsided partnership with the other world in the scheme of events.

Lots of critique have been provoked on the basis of the diminishing capacity of the West hegemony cum the emergent BRICS whose engagement has attracted more attention. All the same, there is an in-built hegemonic tension between the two aspirants. Very importantly, Mazrui's sociological and pre-emptive appraisal is rarely examined. Precisely, the Bondage of Boundariesveers into the long-term prognosis of BRICS. Mazrui (1994, p. 62) draws on Indo-Sino abandonment of communism in the Post-Cold War era and launching into the scheme of capitalism "India is returning to the capitalist fold, and even China is courting Western investment. All these new rivals are creating a black Cinderella on the world stage".

India and china are distinct BRICS members that had to file with global capitalism. Their arrival marks a new shade in global political economy, thus Mazrui (1994, p. 60) becomes more emphatic in new of this emergent blow in Africa, "A future trusteeship systems will be more genuine international and less Western than it was under the old guise. Administering powers for the trusteeship territories Could come from Africa and Asia".

The excerpt affirms the predictive synergy of this theorist in the BRICS purview with Asian distinctiveness and the diminishing influence of the West in Africa. A typical observation shows that China and India maintain the upper side compared to marginal roles of Russia from Europe Brazil from South America and the integrated African side, South Africa. It must be noted that inclusion of South Africa ordinarily defines the global hegemonic arrangement and inevitably justifies multi-polarity doctrine meant to restructure the global system.

Furthermore, a typical investigation shows that Africa has continually been reduced to a residual site of any hegemonic relationship confirming the plot accelerator syndrome. Mazrui (1994, p. 60) broadens the scope of the prognostic survey of the BRICS intervention in Africa:

External recolonization under the banner of humanitarianism is entirely conceivable. Although colonization may be resurfacing, it is likely to look rather different this time around. The recolonization of the future will not be based on the Whiteman's burden or the lion of Judah. It may instead be based on a shared human burden.

Mazrui's assertion settles the imperial activities of the BRICS foregrounding the quest for acquisition of resources and Africa's reliance on external means for its varied sustenance. Meanwhile, the variable "shared human burden indicated congruently balances the horizontal framework of multi-polarity which forms the confluence of political economy and recolonization relations. Following the logic of this analysis, it is imperative to state that recolonization maintains a synthesis of network with political economy that defines the interplay of the two actors in the era of globalization. In this case, BRICS invests its ulterior manipulation of multi-polarity yielding the construction of the synergy of spatial imperialism in Africa.

Africa and the Emergent BRICS: Manifestation of Recolonization

Nothing compares to the relational consequences and the perpetual marginal state Africa continues to occupy from its first period of global integration running through the quest for emancipation to the high point of meltdown characterized by economic slide which only China survived and further generated the development of the BRICS, and more profoundly fostering of political economy concern in Africa. The main emphasis is built around fronting globalization interest. The emergence of the BRICS in the shores of Africa is rather burdensome as this period mark the end of the first phase of its post-independence era showcasing a new shade of strong economic and political preference foregrounding hegemonic wave with its associated incursion. Sassen (2006, p. 04) intrinsically refers to this shift from West intervention to BRICS idealist posture (multi-polarity) as epochal transformation: It is a break of unipolar stronghold of the West commanded by yielding the organic structure of a multilateral system. With the end of the Cold War 1989, the hegemonic status of US was better portrayed unchecked by UN sanction considering its military advances in Iraq, Afghanistan and Kosovo. Given this period, China under Jiang Zamin was developing Chinese economy and while observing the international political scape appropriated the concept of multipolar world as means of broadening the foreign policy horizon in the framework of the leading Communist Party of China. It was geared towards restructuring the vertical arrangement of the global political order.

Though not absolute, the rise of China relatively marks the mobilization of adjoining states institutionalized to constitute the BRICS. The emergence of BRICS is an apt interpretation of a new shape of hegemony. The inclusion of countries in the varied southern continent gives a new ideological thinking of hegemony regime precisely complementing the era of globalization and a dialectical view of power construct cum its utilitarian value. This work is basically concerned with the hegemonic gap and the broad image of Mazruian theoretical assertion weighing on the trend of transition and others in history focusing on the extent of sovereignty of the African states both in the political and economic processes and further measuring the impacts of BRICS hegemonic incursion.

For boosted evaluation, this work draws on the analyses of Clark (2013) and Akpotor (2014). The duo capture the state of African continent considering the relative ideological intercourse and lopsided configuration in any attending hegemonic transition. In an adept touch on the influence of the BRICS in Africa, Clark (2013, p. 6) notes that:

Other BRICS countries such as Russia India and Brazil are investing seriously in many sectors of the African economy. In terms of geographical considerations, the BRICS in the remaking of a new world order should try to reach out to both developing and developed countries to fashion out a new structure that will be of beneficial socio-economic and political to the global society. In a world of real politik each nation is concerned with her national security interests pursued most of the time in a zero-sum game that could raise tension in international politics. Care should be taken so that it will lead to a win-wire situation for all, in order to ensure that diplomacy will lead to reduced tension among the comity of nations in their international relations.

The excerpt is built around the flaws of Africa to evolving a structured pattern to coping any invading code of imperial subjugations and more so has not been able to resolve the tension characterizing the adverse relationship and amply exhibiting Africa's voluntary prostrate posture vis-à-vis the BRICS. Using China as the dynamics of the emerging institution coupled with their concern for global capitalist innovation, Akpotor (2014, p. 43) consolidates above statement by graphically assessing the profile of the BRICS:

With this foresight, the so-called Beijing Consensus" and China's non-intervention is now globally replacing the hegemonic Washington Consensus'. China's foreign policy is chiefly guided by financial as well as political consideration.

This is an invocation of the developing trend of global capitalism and the synergy of the BRICS coordinated interest in political economy. Very importantly, above excerpt is provoked by an antecedent. Akpotor (2011, p. 85) further attests that:

The analysis of state and economy is also greatly enhanced by the application of economic factors. The emergence of new nations in the international scene struggling to grapple with the problem of capitalist development on the one hand, and the centre-periphery relations that exacerbates the level of dependence of the developing states on the other makes the adoption of economic categories for analysis imperative.

This critic consciously represents BRICS with the ideological phrases "new nations in the international scene" and "struggling to grapple with the problem of capitalist development to enunciate the hegemonic incursion and "center periphery relations that exacerbates" to capture the permanent flawed stasis of Africa in the face of BRICS hegemony bloc.

To state the argument of recolonization in concrete terms, six selected Africa states are selected as partial derivative to define the total derivative of this relationship.

Africa and BRICS: Xenophobia in South Africa

When multi-polarity is distilled, multiplier return is largely noted as there is a wide gap between what Africa benefits and the dividends that flow back to the BRICS. This is the ideological bias of hegemony narrative and this construct is organized in concentric circles, the innermost being the bias of imperialism. The relationship between South Africa and other Africa states bears a cognitive development. The democracy that emerged in the post-apartheid era of South Africa has been sustained yielding vibrant economy, thus the choice of BRICS integration 2010. After this period, there has been a tense relationship, especially for Africa residents in South Africa. It must not be forgotten that the whole of Africa garnered available resources to overhaul apartheid regime. Reversely, African residents in South Africa are being heavily sanctioned in the process of xenophobia which defines victimization, alienation and limitation of a particular group. This is a replay of apartheid on Africans in a typical Africa state, and by extension displays that pan-Africanism is just a literal formation. This shade of antagonism marks the worst form of terrorism and intimidation from within. Today, South Africans maintain strong anti-immigrant sentiment against Africa immigrant on the claims that they are being robbed of their jobs and are engaged in criminal practices and business. This is paradoxical, as this selective justice is directed towards only Africans. There has been no report of anti-immigrant influence against other nationals from West or Asia, and this is indication of Africa preying on self.

This has resulted massive extra-judicial killings, looting and burning of immigrants' shops, ravaging of their homes plus churches. The case is worsened as the law enforcement agencies and the mobs have formed alliance, thus justifying the vicious circle of associated violence of apartheid. Xenophobic attacks have been signified in two basic years – 2015 and 2017. It was to resolve the effects and build fresh deal that South Africa, President Jacob Zuma visited different Africa countries. Nigeria that remains the hardest, hit of this assault equally received the president on call. Adebajo (2017, p. 17) notes that Jacob Zuma also schemed for the resolve of widespread xenophobic attack of Nigerians by South African security and immigration officials. Unfortunately, a new phase of harassment assumed an outrageous temper 2017. South Africa and Nigeria are the two political and economic ace-holders in the Black continent, and it is believed that if the African Renaissance must succeed this duo must be bound as one. Simply put, the endless xenophobic intimidation is a flaw that breaks the framework of BRICS multi-polarity meant to generate balanced socio-economic relations across board.

Right from the end of apartheid, South Africa has continued to steer clear of IMF because this institution would have dwarfed the sovereignty of the emergent democracy. Today, the opportunity for economic relief has become rather expansive with the New Development Bank (NDB) established by the BRICS bloc to define its multilateral economy policy. It must be noted, however, that during the proposal of NDB the president of South Africa negotiated Pretoria to be the headquarters of the bank but was defied. This is problematic as the main thrust of the bank is to resolve any related economic downturn in the developing world, and it is believed that proximity to the bank would enhance quick delivery to any nation.

Nigeria and the BRICS

The BRICS percentage of multiplier effect in Africa is insignificant considering the characteristic flaws of its horizontal arrangement. It must be noted that Africa maintains import-oriented economy. The presence of BRICS has worsened this problem as local industries continue to fold up. Nigeria, for instance, is the highest producer of cassava and yam, yet in the recent period China and India had flooded the Nigerian market with imported garri and amala. This remains a

threat to the agricultural market in Nigeria. More so, the Africa political economy is gradually being reduced to colonial space as was the West hegemonic era.

The negotiation for loan also poses serious challenges to African states. An analysis of the New Development Bank is a case study. The establishment of the bank is meant for the ailing economies of the south, yet the assessment of loan is difficult procedure. This is basically due to the location of the headquarters in Beijing, China. The location of the Bank in China is an indication of economic centralism. Beyond NDB, the criterion for loans follow stringent measures. The \$20bn China opted for Nigeria 2016 is a good example. The bargain was difficult and procedures unbearable coupled with the fact that the fund must be assessed by Chinese officials. This is an invocation of Bretton Woods's formality.

Beyond normative evaluation, it has been observed that the level of BRICS technology is on the low side. Many electrical and electronic products from China are below standard. Olawale (2017:6) reports that the Standard Organization of Nigeria (SON) has seized many products aforementioned as they are fake and are mainly from China. In fact, electric cables produced in Nigeria are superior but for the alliance of Chinese manufactures with the Nigeria petit bourgeoisie.

Assessing the Forum on China – Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) on the basis of multi-polarity, it might be stated a win-win relationship, but a further survey reveals otherwise. To be particular, China is highest exporter of goods to Nigeria yet one of least importer of Nigeria goods. In the oil market, to be precise, China and India presently prefer oil in US market to Nigeria despite the heavy patronage of Chinese construction companies. The trade imbalance provides burden of questions.

Egypt and BRICS

The global meltdown of 2008 constitutes the ideological standpoint of BRICS emergence, and has translated US unipolar arrangement to multipolar world market that has increasingly developmental. Today, BRICS assumes the status of inter-continental political bloc engaging mainly Africa in a political economy dialogue. The distance between North Africa and democracy remained relatively wide until the Arab Spring which some critics refer to as the “forth wave” of democratization. It must be noted that this is the period of global democracy closely followed with global capitalism which the BRICS is expected to process in its relationship with Africa.

Considering the crises in Egypt, the role of BRICS was located to the margins. India, which remains the largest democracy, is highly opposed to pro-democracy activism in Egypt as it supported the continuous stay of the pre-existing Hosni regime against the protesting populace. India has, therefore failed to address the out-spoken violence against human rights. The dictates of democracy has been defied. For instance, Nehme (2012:3) avers that China is worse off compared. This critic portrays the basic assumption of China as a non-ideological pragmatist in international affairs, but the real political framework continues to support internationally allergic regimes. This ideological idiosyncrasy was equally displayed as it mobilized intensive support of the failing Hosni Mubarak's regime against the people tagged as agents of chaos. This shows that Beijing foreign policy runs counter to prevailing policy of Africa's non-indifference defined by responsibility to protect from within and without. Pereira and Joao (2011) claim that China lacks the basic facilities that help alleviate crisis or even hold international control of power resources. This is based on China mono-political party system built around outdated communism heavily placed against liberal democracy and the ideal practices of capitalism (Callick, 2011; Anderlini, 2011).

More so, the major flaw of the BRICS is the shortfall of their concern for external intervention especially in the conflicts in Africa. BRICS policy of non-intervention is the invocation of the foregone OAU alternative. The world is shifting from authoritarianism to liberal democracy which the BRICS continues to contend. This marks the Afro BRICS problematic relations. The case of Egypt crises attract confrontation which BRICS highly opposes despite poverty and political alienation that constitute the centerpiece of the protest in 2011. The question of democratic uprising in Egypt is directed towards regime change, but the BRICS policy did not at any measure provide solution, rather it assumed the role of external motivator, thus justifying Nehme (2012) assertion that the world order that development rests on the outcome of crises, and the fundamental truth is that developing states burden in the advent of endless conflict remains a continuum. The untold problems that characterize Egypt from 2011 till the recent period make definite the flaws of BRICS proposal.

Libya and the BRICS

The entire international community considered Gadaffi as an international pariah, and the level of Libya's extra-local relation was reduced and hostile. Gadaffi structured an isolated political regime for Libya, cutting off major powers of the West. It was only the benefactor regions of Africa, South America and the BRIC nations – Brasil, Russia, India and China had strong connection with the regime. Basically these countries voted against the UN 1973 resolution that prescribed strong military intervention in Libya, at least, to pursue regime change as proposed by the rebel Transitional National Council (TNC). More so, Russia and China were grossly opposed to TNC and equally refused to grant legitimacy to TNC unlike other members of the West Community (Chipaike 2012). This is built around the fact that these nations had strong economic tie with Gadaffi in the production of Libya's oil.

The flaws of BRICS necessitated Mustafa Jajil, leader of the TNC about dislodging Russia and China for their support for Gadaffi leadership. Precisely, BRICS inaction is based on many factors, One, Russia for years have been a major supplier of arms to Libya. The conflict, therefore, amounts to Russia's massive economic exploitation. Two, Pradhan (2011:119) avers that India depends on supply of oil from Libya coupled with sizeable Indian minority residents. The Libyan revolt becomes a viable source of economic development. Closely related is the demand for Chinese products plus the multi-billion dollar project within the period of the crisis. Three, the inclusive dialogue negotiated by South-Africa aptly corresponds with other BRICS proposal to avoid the use of force which Monica (2011) refers to as "pacific settlement of controversies" BRICS builds its argument around multilateralism as vital tool of checkmating the Libyan crisis. This decision is an invocation of all territorial integrity, sovereignty of state and non-intervention which evidently contrast the responsibility to protect and interventionist regime of AU non-indifference.

The Libyan crisis remains most volatile considering the size of casualties compared to Egypt and Tunisia, and thus referred UNSC for final resolution. This marks a dialectical interface between NATO and BRICS in the SC Resolution 1973 popularly referred as no-fly-zone in Libya. Aside South Africa, BRICS voted against military intervention. BRICS hegemony marks a total deviation in that it is not characterized by extra-nationalist determinism. This could be traced to their sole economic mercantilism, geared toward exploitation of mineral resources in Africa for the construction of their economies. It is understandably noted that Russia and China are permanent members of UNSC and expected to boost the South in crisis-ridden situation. On the whole, Libya remains victim of the prevailing hegemonic ascendancy. Hence, Akpotor (2011) argues further that underdevelopment in the developing world is engendered by external

economic and political influences, and this implies that the development of the dependent nations is established on imperial continuum. The cardinal indices of this problem lie in the centre and periphery relationship which explains the development and underdevelopment of the two groups displaying the systematic re-production of the values of colonialism which continue to weigh down on any outstanding regime and its associated ideology.

Mali and the BRICS

The flaw of BRICS lies in its particular economic intervention, thereby defying the guarantee of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) that is all embracing. The code of BRICS spatial imperialism remains a lucid interpretation, and this marks a fall-back to the non-intervention and territorial integrity regime of OAU. The BRICS, especially China bears the understanding that Africa is a common geography of resource exploitation to boost multiplier return. The centre-piece of non-indifference is encapsulated in the maintenance central position in course of any crisis. It is a mandate and the UN appreciates any regional body expending its resources for the mainstay of macro-political stability. This is where the BRICS is heavily flawed. This factor captures the complex state which reflects the uncoordinated pursuit and delayed response of BRICS to prevailing conflicts.

China plays a leading role in the BRICS regime, and its activities are mainly confined to socio-economic and infrastructural investment. This is meant to boost construction of bridges, roads and urban development (Henry, 2011). China does not bear the posture of donor, but recipient nation, at least to balance the South/South cooperation equation. The China Economic Council (CEC) in Mali is in charge of infrastructural projects. However, China has its peculiar pattern of exploitation as its projects in Mali are referred to as “gift” and tagged “lied aid” (Henry, 2011). This is the elicitation of the “Angola-Model” where the projects are paid via resources. More so, mainly all the workers are Chinese and the technology transfer is highly limited. At the level of capital cost where is additional payments outside the formal agreement, possible resource concessions becomes the rule.

In a coordinated analysis, Henry (2011, p. 14) graphically explains the ambivalent posture of the BRICS as apparent recipient nation, yet fore grounded with ulterior motive of exploitation:

In a more moderate environment inter-donor and donor-recipient relations appear less diplomatically polarized. Recipient governments take into account an array of ‘hidden cost’ associated with accepting aid from external donors. In spite of an international effort to better coordinate development aid, the optimization of the aid portfolio in the best interest of the country is complicated by inter-donor incompatibilities, high levels of uncertainty and principal-agent issues within the recipient government. Countries that are heavily dependent on external aid face a difficult task in trying to capitalize on the situation.

This excerpt grossly corresponds with Forster et al (2009:32) assertion that China presence in this era of globalization is an invocation of aid regime meant to exploit the economies of the South. The paradox lies in the voluntary allegiance of Africa to its elastic scheme of global capitalism, and further explaining its permanent stasis in the margins of inter-continental relations and dependency on the external.

Sudan and the BRICS

Despite the profound response of China and India in Sudan economy, Brazil and Russia occupy marginal space. Brazil, for instance, always proposes policy intention without functional follow-

up. Russia maintains slightly better posture in the military services and political relations. Hamilton (2011) draws on the support of Russia for Sudan in respect of UNSC Resolution 1706. This had to do with its readiness to support the resolution and the non-consensual UN intervention. This was the era of the heated Darfur crisis and the response from the global world. In the area of military campaign and execution, Russia, like China and India, has contributed in no mean measure. It was engaged in the export of military material resources. Sudan military personnel are equally trained coupled with the maintenance.

On the other side, the intervention of BRICS in Sudan has some limitations, thus capturing the dysfunction of the BRICS, and more to the point of negating the doctrine of multi-polarity ideologically framed to boost South/South co-operation. In the first place, the China infrastructure development had led to the construction of a dam meant for power generation in the poverty stricken region of Nubia. Conversely, the dam ended up dislodging about 50,000 rural dwellers. The quest for resettlement of the people further led to crisis and exchange of violence between the people and the Chinese construction workers. It becomes more paradoxical on the ground that all this infrastructure and related projects are paid via oil, which aptly marks the elastic pursuit of Angola Model. Carvalho (2013) asserts that Chinese loans to Sudan, which are meant to service some projects drag the state more into debts on the basis of the modalities for repayment.

History indicates that from the 1930s, there has been a good number of Indo-Sino nationals residing in Sudan, and it is hoped that in the era of globalization would attract economic and commercial activities. It is noted that most of them work in medium-scale firms, education and health sectors though with limited contribution to the Sudanese economy. It is also expected that the sizeable permanent population would attract massive investment, but the reverse prevails. Navyyar (2008) emphasizes how India reduced Sudan to import-oriented economy with oil export dissipated and export commodities introduced thereby turning Sudan to a common market base. More so, whenever there was oil boom China and India compete for fair share for domestic use. Luke (2014) refers this as the ultimate 'struggle' in quest for payment of infrastructure projects. It has been categorically emphasized that the duo mentioned above refer to themselves as recipient states, and not donor states at least to define their equal state with the developing world. Precisely, the code of oil extortion defies the guarantee of multi-polarity expected to boost large investment. The commanding interest of BRICS rests on exploitation of mineral resources.

The political pursuit of the BRICS is worse off considering their structural diplomacy of non-interference that could be approximated to OAU old doctrine. It must be noted that most flaws characterizing Africa's leadership could be traced to the doctrine. The flawed political enterprise of BRICS in Sudan is easily traced as the concept of state sovereignty, non-intervention in internal affairs of any state remain the logical explanation even as crises emerge. Basically, BRICS egalitarian posture with Africa, therefore, amounts to ulterior ideological framework of exploitation, hence Daniel and Luke (2014, p. 47) aver that:

The main economic impact of China and India's engagement normatively framed as South-South Co-operation has conformed to Sudan's historically, unbalanced political economy dominated by the political elite in Khartoum and the Nile Valley. What was initially a largely politically unencumbered engage with high economic payoffs in Sudan has become caught up in the turbulence of the political storm in and across Sudan.

The role of BRICS in Sudan before and after the secession of South Sudan typifies a reversion to the intricacies of imperialism heavily hinged on economic exploitation meant to bolster multiplier return ultimately benefiting the emergent hegemons. The political terrain is more problematic considering BRICS subjective attachment to the non-intervention doctrine in internal affairs of

any state. It was this dogma that hampered the enterprising scheme of UNSC in the Sudanese unending crises as different negotiations ensued between China and Russia versus other members of the Security Council. In a simple analysis, multi-polarity intended to generate remedy for numerous political economy flaws in Sudan has reversely elasticated the associated historic institutional inertia of Sudanese leadership.

Flaws of African Stakeholders and the New Norm

The emergence of BRICS in Africa could be approximated to the West political economy intercourse in the 19th Century, except for its non-regional occupation. Unlike the intra-conflict relationship of the West, BRICS has an organized framework of co-operation and tolerance and this has burgeoned its Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Africa. This economic diplomacy runs counter the “scramble and petition syndrome” of the West, but for its capacity to negotiate and absorb global economic shock of the recent dispensation. Today, BRICS transverses the entire economic space in quest of gas, oil, natural resource and mining. In the recent period, Mohan (2010:23) observes the broadened scope of BRICS economic intervention in information technology, health, textile industry and automobile engineering amongst strategies and institutional devices. The multi-polarity seems to pay off as AU lacks necessary ideological base to dialectically examine investment and exploitative mechanism of BRICS. All this and more constitute flaws of the new regime.

The policy of non-indifference is highly boosted with viable legal institutions, and has functioned in varied capacities. However, the abundant human and material resources have not projected the much needed success. This is better understood, considering scope of the norm. The major flaw is derived from the vertical structure of African leaders, which defy the guarantee of a definite sanction regime. This is consequent upon the fact that many leaders practice quasi-democracy and others are dictators in their own place. One common factor that commands their power and relationship is their support for leadership control and sustenance of self at the detriment of democratic leadership and welfare of the people. More so, most African leaders assume power through manipulations of elections and maladjustment of constitution thus widening the gap between civic and primordial publics. Most violent interface between these two groups substantiates this claim. Beyond this problem, there is a quest of some leaders to sustain themselves in power beyond the elastic limit of tenural democracy. These are common indices of Zimbabwean democracy. President Mugabe until the recent power scruple has been holding state power from independence in 1980, thereby flawing the dictates of civil rule. It is even more tragic as host of other African leaders continually subscribe to electoral machination and rulership of purported quasi-democracy and tautological tenurism.

Admittedly, the prospect set by this dynamic norms remains a tutorial to leadership, because the substructure of the regime is founded on democracy which will inevitably yield the pursuit of rule of law and good governance. It must be noted that the policy of non-indifference is summed up in the responsibility-to-protect. The two variables complement each other. The problem of most African leaders lies in their assumption of norm as mere idea, hence the failure to proactively establish relative ideological framework thus the numerous challenges in the scheme of socio-economic and political space. Murithi (2009:106) states that the mission emphasis of the non-indifference is the responsibility to protect in all related problems in Africa. However, this prospect has been misguided and misappropriated by African leaders in varied respects. One, African leaders and institutional stakeholders are not informed on the BRICS strategy to boost their economic impetus, as they project themselves as equal partners with the South thereby shielding the inbuilt imperial synergy. Two, considering the thirst for infrastructural aid and grant

for Africa's development, the quest for BRICS monopoly right of production is rarely observed. Three, most policy drivers in Africa negotiate short term business deals with limited benefits compared to long term prospects that will generate lasting and all-embracing development.

BRICS presentation of multi-polarity ordinarily corresponds with the non-indifference initiative of AU. The problem lies in Africa's leaders non-challant attitude to the prevailing scheme of globalization. Despite the inclusion of an African party among the BRICS, Africa continues to maintain rigid sub-hegemonic ranking which thus regenerates, recreates and reinvent itself. Most prospects are reduced to flops and ideological arrangements cum outstanding projects become flawed idealism. Because of the marginal status of Africa, most leaders are relaxed and continue to negotiate external intervention, and further still defining its institutional bearing in a hegemony debate which becomes more problematic. All this and more provide enabling environment for the BRICS sustenance of its hegemony in the African political space.

This paper oscillates between two commanding variables – non-indifference and multi-polarity of AU and BRICS respectively. The policy of non-indifference has come of age and Africa is becoming a “cognitive region” (Adler, 1997, p. 254). Unlike the norm of OAU non-intervention, non-indifference is only limited to the function of conflict management but by extension it grossly involves humanitarian intervention, pursuit of viable economy and good governance characterized by democratization and human right reforms (Abrahamson 2000. P. 128). This new evolution graphically expresses a shift from the conservative norm to a dynamic and responsive norm, and basically meant to address and overhaul any outstanding and impending aversion from within and without. Most precisely, this thematic curve is formed by the inability of the AU to discharge its responsibilities appropriately in the continent, and rather reduce the level of dependency on external forces. In the post-period of African independence, there are two phases of Africa's relations with the outside world. The first period lasts from 1960 referred to as Africa year of independence to the institution of non-indifference regime. The period is termed the latent stage of Africa's integration with the global universe, subsumed naivety and inexperience. The entire scope of this era was driven around Africa relationship with the West. The second phase marks a paradigm-shift into the manifest period of non-indifference, and it showcases the era of massive information in global diplomacy.

Given this arrangement, it is assumed that Africa has shed off its ignorance and simultaneously reduced its level of dependency on the outside world, thus the pursuit of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). This becomes the defining moment of the manifest stage considering the various resources available for the boosting of its production, as it addresses how institutional identities are located, processed and injected into continental schemes at least to ward off post-colonial impressions and ensure African problems are followed with African solutions this period marks a meeting point between Africa and the BRIC/S. To a large extent, the influence of the West is beginning to wane in Africa. A gap has been created, which rising BRICS hegemonic bloc is bent on closing. Any hegemony profile is always determined by the extension of political economic influence beyond its limited borders. The coincidence lies in the corresponding ideological scheme of the two actors. To note, all the members of this hegemony bloc were colonized by the West except Russia. The multi-polarity ideology, therefore, matches the interest and prevailing issues of Africa.

The non-indifference policy could directly be approximated to the emergence of the BRIC later translated BRICS with the integration of South Africa. More important is the fact that this body is exhumed from the rubrics of West imperialism, and multi-polarity ordinarily signifies a blend of

horizontal relationship with Africa. BRICS attempts to pull the world from unipolar to the multilateral epoch that captures the ideological standpoint of Africa's concern, and thus broadens the corpus of the South in global politics with definite strategy and alertness.

On the reverse, the basic guarantee of multi-polarity has defied itself as most flaws relevant to the West hegemony regime un/consciously reconfigure and reproduce the dominant image of the former myth, thus justifying Achille (1992) observation that the basic goal of any institution is not just to bring about specific political consciousness into being but to make it effective. This is where the prime factor of BRICS multi-polarity becomes problematic as the body continues to impose its ideology and conversely invading development of the AU. The Afro-BRICS relations dwell around twisted intervention of the BRICS and followed with surplus explanations. The intercourse is characterized by reverse of the ideology meant to redeem Africa. Beyond apparent observation of the literal presentation, the emergence of BRICS carries a covert intention sealed with strong capitalist propensity and continues to keep Africa in the margins of international political economy participation. The code of BRICS activities in Africa pendulates between two intervals – absolute domination and resistance. The former expresses the scheme and antics employed by BRICS to sustain its synergy of exploitation and continually imposing its status on Africa, while the latter limits any form of negotiation or protest against their high-handed aversions.

More problematic is the position of Africa's leadership and passive followership of coded international diplomacy in the era of globalization. In most cases, gestures and inflections of diplomacy are taken casually as African leaders lack deeper understanding of proposals and related actions. Hegemony determinism is cyclical and vibrantly impacted on Africa considering the vicious circle of its perpetual sub-hegemonic configuration. More so, Africa's subordinated ranking continues to reverberate through the course of inter-local discourse thereby displaying its regular marginal posture in any outstanding epoch and development.

Conclusion

From all indications, Mazruitheory of recolonization captures Africa's elastic posture in the fringes of international relations till the recent dispensation coupled with the flawed synergy of the new doctrine. Precisely, this study demonstrates the mobility of BRICS from the margins of the decolonized to the center of global influence with its institutional size that signifies broad potential to repudiating the former owner and control of the wheat and organizing itself into a formidable hegemonic body in Africa. This emergence marks a replay of historic imperialism except for the distinction that lies in the period of globalization commanded by spatial colonization displaying the second phase of Africa hegemonic displacement. The new phase is more recessive as Africa continues to assume the volunteer sub-hegemonic posture having failed to grasp the ulterior background of BRICS multi-polarity. This is the signification of Africa's minority complex women around BRICS hegemonic preferment.

More so, the integration of South Africa plainly articulates blurred multilateral impression which displays the partial derivative of the African side operating in a familiar terrain. China, the foremost actor in the BRICS bloc maintains paradoxical hegemonic framework. Having succeeded in sponsoring the building of a new headquarter outfit in Addis-Ababa have simultaneously relocated AU headquarters to Pretoria. This could be justified on the ground that all negotiations of BRICS and Africa are held in Pretoria. To be precise, the numerous Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) summits are either held in Pretoria or Johannesburg. This is a definitive show of power and manipulation of the outstanding.

Like the Raceto Nikki, the BRICS nations as hurriedly negotiating their sphere of influence across Africa. Very importantly, recolonization theory intersects with BRICS political economy activism at regular interval. The theory evidently displays the concentric circle of imperialism in Africa, while the latter depicts BRICS hegemonic brinkmanship daily appropriated to signify Marxism at the plain level but engrossed in capitalist temper. The merger of the two codes is a rare specials of ideology and innovation aptly tagged Marxio-capitalism which tends to underestimate the ulterior design of the quintet imperial monolith in Africa, and by extension, Afro-BRICS political economy dialogue congruously matches the theoretical prognosis of Mazrui (1994) aptly justifying the utility of recolonization theory

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