THE US AND FRENCH COIN EXPERIENCES IN VIETNAM AND ALGERIA A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Abstract

This study analyzes, in comparative and historical context, international events as they concern the US and French approaches to counter-insurgency (COIN) in Algeria and Vietnam. While the two super-powers embraced a whole gamut of counter-insurgency experiences, this study is selective in discussing the major differences and similarities that distinguished their approaches to COIN in both Algeria and Vietnam. Leaning on the basic principles and foundations of international studies, continuity and changes that occurred over time in respective COIN operations and experiences have been identified. While indices bordering on: ‘colonial origins’, ‘adoption of familiar COIN principles’, and ‘war of national resistance’, have been put forward as causal explanation for similarities in the COIN operations, the US and French COINs, however, differed in the application of the COIN principles. The later determined the overall success and failure of the COIN operations in Vietnam and Algeria.