JUSTIFICATION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF AFRICAN METAPHYSICS AGAINST THE THEORY OF LOGICAL POSITIVISM

Abstract

This essay critically explores the justification of African metaphysics in response to the challenges raised by the theory of logical positivism. Logical positivism, with its verification principle, dismissed metaphysical discourse as meaningless since it could not be empirically verified or analytically proven. Such a stance has often been used to marginalize non-Western metaphysical traditions, including African philosophy, which emphasizes spiritual ontology, communal existence, and the unity of material and immaterial realities. The essay argues that African metaphysics remains philosophically valid, not only because logical positivism is internally inconsistent—its own verification principle cannot be empirically verified—but also because metaphysical categories are indispensable for meaning-making, identity, and ethical reasoning. Drawing upon the works of African philosophers such as PlacideTempels, John Mbiti, and Kwame Gyekye, the essay demonstrates that African metaphysics presents a holistic and context-sensitive account of reality that challenges the reductionism of positivist scientism. Ultimately, the discussion reaffirms the legitimacy of African metaphysics as a vital philosophical framework and highlights the importance of plural rationalities in global philosophical discourse.